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Contract Theory-Who Needs It?
Avery W. Katzt
Reconstructing Contracts
Douglas G. Baird. Harvard, 2013. 170 pages.
Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and Context
Brian H. Bix. Cambridge, 2012. 202 pages.
FoundationalPrinciplesof ContractLaw
Melvin A. Eisenberg. Oxford, forthcoming.
INTRODUCTION
Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backward. But then one forgets the other clausethat it must be lived forward.
Soren Kierkegaardl
Both law students and law teachers have traditionally been
drawn to conceptual projects that attempt to systematize the
field of contract law. The reasons for this are easy to see: the
field is doctrinally complex, few beginning students have any
substantial experience with the kinds of fact patterns that arise
in the cases, and the law is a locus of contestation over fundamental issues of economic liberalism that go to the heart of the
capitalist system. Thus, there has long been both an appetite
and a market for syntheses of the field that go beyond the usual
study aids and hornbooks. A generation ago, Professor Grant
Gilmore's The Death of Contract, Professor Charles Fried's
t Vice Dean and Milton Handler Professor of Law, Columbia University School of
Law. I am grateful to Lisa Bernstein and to panelists and audience members at the January 2014 meeting of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Jurisprudence
for helpful comments, and to the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for organizing this review symposium, for their very helpful advice, and for their extraordinary patience in shepherding me through their publication process.
1 Soren Kierkegaard, Selected Early Entries from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, in Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, eds, The Essential Kierkegaard 3, 12
(Princeton 2000).
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Contract as Promise, and, for those with greater stamina, Professor Patrick Atiyah's The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract
addressed this intellectual need, and all three are still unquestionably worth the attention of first-year students and their
teachers.2 But time passes, new problems arise, case law develops, and the frontiers of political contestation shift; and a new
cohort of guidebooks is needed for a new cohort of lawyers.3
This Review considers and compares three new books that
offer theoretical syntheses of contract law and theory: Professor
Douglas Baird's Reconstructing Contracts; Professor Melvin Ei4
senberg's forthcoming FoundationalPrinciplesof Contract Law;
and Professor Brian Bix's Contract Law: Rules, Theory, and
Context. The books' intended audiences overlap to a considerable
extent, but each is addressed to a different ideal reader. Baird's
book, while providing much of interest to scholars and teachers,
is self-consciously aimed at beginning law students (p ix); a
number of chapters are based on material originally presented
in lecture form at The University of Chicago (p ix). Eisenberg's
book, in contrast, integrates material from over two dozen law
review articles published over the last twenty-five years and
combines it with his own survey and critique of the work of
many other leading scholars. It is thus primarily aimed at an
audience of contract law scholars, though it will be an extremely
valuable companion for any law student who makes the time for
it (especially if the student's contracts teacher has assigned Eisenberg's casebooks). Bix's book, the most eclectic of the three,
aims to bridge the gap between these two audiences and to add a
third as well; as an entry in the Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy and Law series, it is also intended as a legal primer for
students of the philosophy of law and political science (p xi).
Any contemporary scholar offering a synthetic account of
the law of contracts necessarily writes in the shadow of the great

2
See generally Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State 1974); Charles
Fried, Contract as Promise:A Theory of ContractualObligation (Harvard 1981); P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford 1979).
3
Also worth mentioning in this context is what for years has probably been the
most popular supplementary reading used and purchased by law students: Marvin A.
Chirelstein's Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts (Foundation 7th ed
2013), which sets the standard for student hornbooks but focuses on doctrine rather than
on articulating general theoretical principles.
4
Citations in this Review refer to the July 22, 2013, manuscript of the book.
5
See generally Lon L. Fuller, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, and Mark P. Gergen, Basic
ContractLaw (West 9th ed 2013).
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commentators of the field and of their intellectual debates. For
at least the last century, contracts jurisprudence and pedagogy
in the United States has been organized around two competing
if overlapping intellectual paradigms: formalism and realism.
This is not the place for a full account of the relationship between the two, but the main themes are easily summarized.6
Formalism emphasizes that, in order to understand the law, one
must master a complicated but ultimately coherent framework of
principles that can, with practice, be applied in a predictable and
intersubjective fashion; on this view, the value of case analysis is
that it focuses law students on a representative sample of concrete applications that illustrate the relevant rules and principles. Realism, in contrast, emphasizes that the law is not a logical system but rather a loosely connected set of practices,
conventions, traditions, and values that sometimes exhibit regular form but sometimes do not. On this view, case law still merits study not because it illustrates fundamental legal principles,
but because it embodies the law as it operates in practice. Blackletter doctrine is accordingly useful as a filing system, helpful in
summarizing and referring to a complex body of legal material;
but it is always imperfect, full of exceptions and contradictions,
and subject to evolution and change. Knowing which doctrine
will be applied in a given case, or whether a new category or exception is likely to be created, requires an appreciation of this
larger context-what Professor Karl Llewellyn called "situation
sense."7
The authors of the three books under review, like all of us
who may read them, are heirs of this intellectual contest and
thus are both formalists and realists, although in different
measures. All the authors direct substantial attention to legal
doctrine and, to various extents, attempt to pull it into some coherent order (though Bix is most comfortable with the idea that

6
For a classic but tendentious account from one of the most prominent and polemical later Legal Realists, see generally Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (Yale
1977). For a more contemporary analysis that focuses on commonalities between the
schools and that presents Gilmore's account as mythical, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging 44-63 (Princeton
2010).
7
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:Deciding Appeals 60-61 (Little,
Brown 1960). For an elaboration of what Llewellyn may have meant by the term, and for
the classic history of the Legal Realist paradigm, see William Twining, Karl Llewellyn
and the Realist Movement 217-27 (Cambridge 2d ed 2012).
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no complete coherence may be achieved)., But at the same time,
all of them take a pragmatic approach to the law of contracts,
defining their approaches in opposition to those of classical writers such as Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and rejecting any idea that the law
can be properly understood without attending to the substance
of the activity that it purports to govern.
This Review suggests that all three books have considerable
merit and that all have different strengths; but none of the three
really addresses what is foundationally distinctive about contract law-that is, what justifies our considering it a separate
field of jurisprudence. The key feature of contract law, as opposed to the other standard first-year subjects, is that it affords
private parties the power of lawmaking. Contractual obligations
are primarily created by decentralized nonstate actors pursuing
their own goals and plans, not by state officials making law and
policy for society at large. Because they are decentralized and
unofficial, contracts can be tailored to the needs of particular
parties and particular transactions; because they are decentralized and unofficial, they raise distinctive problems of formality,
interpretation, and enforcement.
Unlike tort or criminal law, contract law can operate without the presence or participation of state officials-or even of
professional lawyers. As I tell my students on the first day of
class, a few of them may become judges or legislators, and some
may work at administrative agencies. In so doing, these few may
have regular occasion to make law in the form of judgments,
statutes, regulations, and rulings. But the bulk of them will not
become public officials; rather, they will represent individual clients. And on behalf of those clients, as they write letters, return
phone calls, seek to settle cases, and the like, they will be making law every day, and it will be contract law that they are making. To make good law and to help their clients make good law,
these lawyers need to understand what they are doing. The insights that are afforded them by these three books are considerable, but they are not as great as they might have been, because
the authors' attentions remain focused on official rules of law as
they are applied in public institutions.

s

See text accompanying notes 54-55.
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I. BAIRD'S RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS
Baird's book is the shortest of the three but, in its own way,
the most ambitious. It aims, in the author's words, to "set out a
few core ideas that unite the law of contracts" (p ix). And the
book does set out a number of basic lessons in its introduction
and eight short chapters. These lessons include: ultimately,
some form of objective interpretation is the only game in town
(pp 1-45); the only choice is which form is most reasonable (pp
9-24); lots of disputes that have little to do with exchange wind
up as contracts cases because somebody made a promise along
the way (pp 25-45); the most important basis of contractual obligation is bargained-for exchange (passim, but especially pp 945); as a practical matter and with occasional exceptions, expectation damages are the best default remedy for breach of contract (pp 46-77); social norms of fair dealing should be relevant
to, though not determinative of, legal outcomes (pp 78-95);
breaching a contract leads to all kinds of legal and practical consequences, not just an assessment of damages (passim); legal
rules should focus on ensuring the smooth operation of the market as a whole, as opposed to trying to reach the correct result in
every individual case (passim, but especially pp 96-146); and,
perhaps most importantly, clarity in communication and planning is always a good thing, which is why formalism is often a
good interpretive approach, so long as one does not take it too
far (passim).
The author's promise that all can be understood through the
framework of a small set of fundamental principles, however, is
in important respects at odds with the deep contextual, historical, and institutional knowledge that he deploys in presenting
and analyzing these principles. He draws on insights from the
economic analysis of contracts, but far from exclusively. In two
chapters, he delves into historical materials to show that the
conventional reading of several leading cases is based on a misunderstanding of the actual circumstances that led to those cases (pp 9-45).9 In another, he unearths the correspondence between

9 The discussion of Hamer v Sidway, 27 NE 256 (NY 1891), is based on Baird's
own investigation of the historical record, as more fully elaborated in one of his earlier
writings. See Douglas G. Baird, Reconstructing Contracts: Hamer v. Sidway, in Douglas
G. Baird, ed, Contracts Stories 160, 160-85 (Foundation 2007). The discussions of Raffles
v Wichelhaus, 159 Eng Rep 375 (Ex 1864), and Mills v Wyman, 20 Mass 207 (1825), are
based respectively on the research of A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive:
The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 Cardozo L Rev 287 (1989), and Geoffrey R. Watson,
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Justice Holmes and a now-obscure scholar to compare the advantages and limitations of simple and complex theories and to
explore the conceptual connections between the remedies of expectation damages and specific performance (pp 46-56). And in
yet another, he takes the reader on a brief excursion into the sociology and economics of the typical con game, followed by another into the economics of reputational signaling, all by way of
presenting the contextual background for a larger discussion of
the law governing the interpretation of fine print contracts (pp
130-36).
At least for the knowledgeable reader, it is these more contextual discussions, accompanied by the author's many fresh insights into classic cases and doctrinal arguments, that will constitute the primary pleasure of the book. One extended example
will have to suffice to illustrate the point. In the first chapter of
the book, Baird makes use of Professor Brian Simpson's historical research into nineteenth-century British futures markets to
shed new light on an old and familiar argument between
Holmes and Professor Gilmore on the relative merits of objective
and subjective interpretation. The argument arises over the
classic case of Raffles v Wichelhaus,1o in which two Liverpool
merchants contracted for the purchase and sale of a load of cotton that was on its way from Bombay on a ship bearing the singular name of "Peerless," only to discover after the fact that
there were actually two ships traveling that sea route that bore
that name, one of which (the one carrying the cotton) was running two months behind the other." It is not reported what happened when the earlier ship arrived in port without the promised cargo, but by the time the second ship arrived, prices had
fallen and the buyer was no longer willing to take delivery (p 9).
When sued by his aggrieved seller, he claimed that, because
there were two ships and each party (allegedly) had in mind a
different ship when making the bargain, there was no agreement and hence no contractual obligation.12 The court accepted
this argument, or so the conventional reading goes, and found
for the defendant (pp 9-11).

In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman Reconsidered, 71 Tulane L Rev 1749
(1997), the former of which is also reprinted in Baird's Contracts Stories.
10 159 Eng Rep 375 (Ex 1864).
11 Id.
12 Id at 376.
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The Raffles case is an old chestnut that is prominently featured in modern casebooks to this day, 13 no doubt in part because of its improbable and ironic fact pattern. But Baird is less
concerned with its result than with reconstructing and defending an analysis by Holmes that Gilmore, almost eighty years
later, characterized as "altogether astonishing" and "an extraordinary tour de force."14 Holmes argued, counterintuitively, that
Raffles provides support for an objective view of interpretation:
It is commonly said that such a contract is void, because of
mutual mistake as to the subject-matter, and because therefore the parties did not consent to the same thing. But this
way of putting it seems to me misleading. The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their conduct .... The true ground of the decision was
not that each party meant a different thing from the other, as
is implied by the explanation which has been mentioned, but
that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered one
thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another.15
Gilmore, for his part, presented Holmes's analysis as if it
were self-evidently wrong; he viewed Raffles as the quintessential instance of the failure of the objective theory of interpretation. 16 How could the parties have said different things, as
Holmes would have it, if they used the very same word, "Peerless"? But as Baird explains, it is indeed possible to say different
things by use of the same word, depending on what one means
by the word "said." One possible meaning of "said"-evidently
the one that Gilmore had in mind-is strictly physical: a person
"says" something when he manipulates muscles of the larynx,
tongue, palate, and lips to produce a certain set of sound waves
in the air that can be detected by another person who has the
appropriate aural equipment, whatever the effect on the person
who receives the sound waves. More plausibly for the purposes
of human communication, however, "said" means rather more
13 See, for example, Ian Ayres and Gregory Mass, Studies in Contract Law 187
(Foundation 8th ed 2012); John P. Dawson, et al, Contracts: Cases and Comment 294
(Foundation 10th ed 2013); John D. Calamari, et al, Cases and Problems on Contracts
290 (West 6th ed 2011).
14 Gilmore, Death of Contract at 40-41 (cited in note 2).
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Common Law 279 (Harvard 2009).
16 See Gilmore, Death of Contract at 41 (cited in note 2) ("The magician who could
'objectify' Raffles v Wichelhaus ...could, the need arising, objectify anything.").
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than this: it means that there has been a communication, with
semantic content, sent from one person and intended to be received by another. (For example, if I go into the streets of a foreign city where no one around me speaks English and create the
sound waves that in English correspond to the word "Peerless,"
have I said anything? On the physical definition I have; but on
the interpersonal definition I plainly have not.)
For purposes of contracts, law, or indeed any aspect of human communication, it is the interpersonal definition that is
relevant. In order for words to have communicative effect, the
listener and hearer must speak the same language; functionally,
they must share the same conventions regarding what sounds
are used to refer to what concepts. Such conventions constitute
what the literary and legal critic Stanley Fish has labeled an
"interpretive communit[y]." 17 Once one recognizes this point
about the way that language works, the distinction between subjective and objective interpretation loses much of its bite, because whether two people share the same linguistic convention
is a social fact that can be determined by interpersonally objective criteria. (For example, "Peerless" is not a word that Spanish
speakers recognize, but it is a word that English speakers recognize; and competent Spanish and English speakers recognize
that this is so.) In this regard, Holmes had a better understanding of the way that language works than Gilmore did.18

17 See Stanley E. Fish, Interpretingthe "Variorum," 2 Critical Inquiry 465, 483-85
(Spring 1976) (defining "interpretive communities" as communities "made up of those
who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions").
18 The same methodological point was made by Eisenberg's senior author Lon
Fuller more than half a century ago, and it continues to be printed in the current version
of his contracts casebook:

It is sometimes concluded that what a party objectively means is not a question
of intent at all. This conclusion rests on a confusion of thought concerning the
meaning of intent, as is shown by the analogy of legislation .... Th[e] constitutional relation between courts and statutes is commonly expressed by saying
that the intent of the legislature governs the interpretation of a statute. Yet it
is generally recognized that the intent that the court must respect is a formalized thing, and not the actual inner intent of particular legislators. A statute
becomes law only after it has been enacted in accordance with certain rules;
when these rules have been followed the statute stands as law even though
Senator Sorghum confides to his dinner partner that he was asleep when the
bill was read and did not know what he was voting for.
Fuller, Eisenberg, and Gergen, Basic ContractLaw at 418 (cited in note 5). For the original
publication, see Lon L. Fuller, Basic Contract Law 295-96 (West 1947) (using slightly different language).
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Applying this conception to Raffles in order to determine
whether the parties said the same thing, we must ask whether
they followed the same linguistic conventions when they used
the word "Peerless" in their contract. If not, we must then ask
whether one party's convention was demonstrably more authoritative than the other's. The seller's barrister argued that the
parties did follow the same convention: in particular, he argued
that the language "to arrive ex Peerless" was understood in the
local mercantile community to refer solely to the allocation of
shipwreck risk; if the ship "Peerless" were to fail to reach port,
parties who had contracted "ex Peerless" would be excused from
their contractual obligations, while parties who had contracted
without such limitation would not. 19 Gilmore readily accepted
this argument, but the judges did not; they immediately began
badgering the hapless barrister with a variety of hypotheticals
relating to identically named pairs of warehouses and wineries.20
Baird, drawing on Simpson's historical research on the origins of futures markets, suggests that Gilmore was wrong and
the judges were right. If the Peerless contract was indeed a futures contract, as Baird finds likely, then the time of sailing is
obviously material. For a community of futures traders, cotton
on a ship that departs in October is just not the same commodity
as cotton on a ship that departs in December. Similarly, the Raffles case did not turn (as Gilmore would have it) on a conflict between two subjective interpretations: the one that the seller had
in mind and the one that the buyer had in mind. Instead, it
turned (as Holmes would have it) on a conflict between two objective interpretations: the shipwreck-risk interpretation advanced by the seller, and the futures-market interpretation advanced by Simpson, Baird, and perhaps the judges as well. But,
as Baird points out, none of this matters because of the particular procedural posture of the case. As it happens, Raffles came
to the Court of Exchequer on a demurrer to a plea; the buyer
had defended on the ground that the parties had referred to
different ships, and the seller demurred, that is, asserted that
the buyer's defense should be struck down as legally irrelevant
(p 10).21 Because the case was up on a demurrer, the buyer did
not need to show that his interpretation was the better one in
19
20

See Raffles, 159 Eng Rep at 375.
See Gilmore, Death of Contract at 37-38 (cited in note 2). See also Raffles, 159

Eng Rep at 375-76.
21 See Raffles, 159 Eng Rep at 375.
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order to win the case; he only needed to show that it was plausible. The seller, in contrast, needed to show that no plausible set
of facts could make the difference between the two ships legally
material; and given the possibility of futures trading, such a
showing could not be made (pp 11-13).
By combining historical analysis, interpretive theory, and
attention to the niceties of legal procedure, Baird solves the puzzle. Raffles is not a hard case; it is an easy case and it comes out
the right way. The judges understood it and so did Holmes; the
only ones who did not were Gilmore and generations of law
teachers and their students. I myself have taught this case for
twenty-five years under the influence of Gilmore's view. But
next time, it will be different.
This discussion of Raffles appears early in the book (pp 920), and it whets the reader's appetite for what follows. In the
ensuing chapters, Baird offers similarly fresh and thoughtful insights into many other classic cases, hypotheticals, and arguments. By the end, one may not mind much that the book's initial promise that contract law can be satisfactorily explained by
a small set of ideas is not fully realized (though it comes closer
to delivering on that promise in the earlier chapters on intent,
bargain, and the expectation measure of damages). After all, the
author himself concedes the claim in the final pages of the
book, which he appropriately styles an epilogue rather than a
conclusion.22

The book, accordingly, should not be viewed as a mere primer or introduction to the field, even if the blurbs on its jacket
label it as such. Any student who reads it will surely get a lot
out of it; and it is short and well written enough that many will
be motivated to do so. But it is also a lively and thoughtful tour
through many of the great cases and controversies of the field,
from which anyone who teaches contracts will profit.

22

Baird explains:

Regardless of the tools that we use, we cannot expect pat answers. The law of
contracts and the world in which it operates are both too rich and too subtle to
be reduced to a single metric. We must continue to reconstruct the law of contracts, remembering that the test of new organizing ideas or formal rules is
whether they are useful. (pp 150-51)
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EISENBERG'S FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW

Eisenberg's book project (not yet in print and still subject to
final revisions, but which has been circulating in a sort of samizdat format among contract law scholars for the last year) differs from Baird's both in approach and scope. Eisenberg assuredly does not believe that the law of contracts can be understood
by mastering a few simple ideas; while he offers a variety of
frameworks for understanding individual doctrines or clusters of
doctrines, he instead emphasizes the field's complexity and richness. His project is similarly magisterial, incorporating and integrating materials from twenty-five years' worth of legal scholarship, including numerous law review articles23 as well as his
own widely used contracts casebook.24 (The first chapter, which

23 For the original articles, not all of which are formally cited in the July 22 draft of
Eisenberg's book, see generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 Harv L Rev 637 (1976); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U Chi L Rev 1 (1979); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 Harv L Rev 741 (1982); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Principles of Consideration, 67 Cornell L Rev 640 (1982); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 Stan L Rev 1107 (1984); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 Cal L Rev 563 (1992); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
Third-PartyBeneficiaries, 92 Colum L Rev 1358 (1992); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and Acceptance, 82 Cal L Rev 1127
(1994); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
Stan L Rev 211 (1995); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loyola LA L Rev 13
(1995); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L
Rev 1005 (1998); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85
Cal L Rev 821 (1997); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw U L Rev 805 (2000); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic
Contract Law, 88 Cal L Rev 1743 (2000); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Duty to Rescue in
Contract Law, 71 Fordham L Rev 647 (2002); Melvin Aron Eisenberg and Brett H.
McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of Overreliance, 54 Hastings L J 1335
(2003); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 Cal L Rev 1645 (2003);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 Cal L Rev 1573 (2003); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 Wis L Rev 271; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Actual
and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference
Principle in Contract Law, 93 Cal L Rev 975 (2005); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 Mich L Rev 559 (2006); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances,Interpretation,Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 Mich L Rev 1413 (2009); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability,and Frustration,1 J Legal Analysis 207 (2009);
Shawn J. Bayern and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and Its Discontents, 2013 Mich St L Rev 1; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ConflictingFormulas for Measuring
Expectation Damages, 45 Ariz St L J 369 (2013).
24 See generally Fuller, Eisenberg, and Gergen, Basic Contract Law (cited in note 5).
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sets out the author's general methodological commitments, also
draws on his classic work on the common law process.)25
Following this first chapter, the project follows the organization of the casebook, as well as (for better or worse) its emphasis. The latest version of the manuscript includes seventeen
chapters on remedies for breach of contract but devotes comparatively little attention to seven short chapters on what the casebook calls "problems of performance":26 good faith, material
breach, substantial performance,27 conditions, anticipatory repudiation, insecurity, and cure. There are three chapters on consideration and freedom of contract; twelve on interpretation (including interpretation rules relating to offer and acceptance);
seven on mistake, impracticability and frustration, and related
problems of disclosure; one on third-party beneficiaries (though
none on assignment); and one on the Statute of Frauds. There
are also four chapters that respond primarily to developments in
the academic literature as opposed to legal doctrine; these focus
on the topics of efficient breach, overreliance, behavioral economics, and relational contracts. (The latest manuscript contains no chapter on public policy or the limits of contractual alienability, even though the author's casebook chapter on these
topics has been the subject of regular revision over the last few
editions.25 For this reason, one may expect the published version
of the book to include some substantial discussion of this issue.)
In part because of this consistency in organization, contracts
scholars who have taught out of the author's casebook (as I have
done for over twenty years, through its last six editions) will find
this project especially valuable. Many of the discussions expand
and elaborate on case and jurisprudential notes that are only
briefly covered in the casebook; others make explicit a theoretical framework that the casebook only indirectly implies by its
organization of cases and materials. For example, chapter 3 (on

25

See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (Harvard

1988).
Fuller, Eisenberg, and Gergen, Basic ContractLaw at 1011 (cited in note 5).
Much of the discussion of material breach and substantial performance, furthermore, focuses on the tensions between restitution and expectation damages and between market and individualized measures of material defect.
28 Compare Fuller, Eisenberg, and Gergen, Basic Contract Law 989-1010 (West 9th
ed 2013), with Lon L. Fuller and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 853-84
(West 8th ed 2006), Lon L. Fuller and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 83466 (West 7th ed 2001), Lon L. Fuller and Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law
795-846 (West 5th ed 1990).
26
27
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the bargain principle) unifies the topics of reliance, consideration, modifications, and requirements and option contracts in a
way that is rather clearer and more coherent than the corresponding casebook discussion; similarly, chapters 26 and 27 (on
expression rules and offers) substantially tighten the connection
between the doctrines of contract interpretation and formation.
A few chapters draw together material that appears in a different order (and sometimes in completely different sections) in
earlier versions of the casebook. For example, chapter 2 (on donative promises) integrates cases on moral consideration, and
chapter 4 (on unconscionability) brings in material on standardform contracts that does not appear in the casebook until well
after the chapters on interpretation, hundreds of pages (and
multiple weeks in the semester) later.29 Perhaps most helpfully,
the author's discussion of the tension between text and context
is brought forward and discussed at the outset of the materials
on interpretation, instead of after a discussion of the rules of offer and acceptance (ch 24 § A).30 For these reasons, I will surely
recommend this book to my students once it is published, even
though it is rather longer than the supplementary materials
that they are currently assigned.
In contrast to Baird, who draws predominantly though not
exclusively on ideas from the economic analysis of law, Eisenberg is methodologically pluralistic and eclectic. He explicitly rejects any single-valued normative theory, whether motivated by
efficiency, distributional justice, or communal solidarity, and
prizes pragmatism over theoretical consistency (ch 1 § A). Similarly, he trusts commonsense folk morality (in his terminology,
"social morality") over analytic or academic arguments (in his
terminology, "critical morality"):
Monistic theories fail because they deny the complexity of
life. In contract law, as in life, all applicable meritorious
moral values and policy goals should be taken into account,
even if those values and goals may sometimes conflict, even
See Fuller, Eisenberg, and Gergen, Basic ContractLaw at 417, 753 (cited in note 5).
A few organizational choices are more questionable. For example, I am not sure
that I see the value of discussing doctrines of trade usage, course of dealing, and course
of performance before the basic dichotomy between text and context has been introduced.
And the parol evidence rule, which in the casebook is tightly (and in my view properly)
connected to the text/context distinction, is in the book manuscript left isolated in the
last sections of the interpretation materials, after the chapter on the indefiniteness doctrine and before the (at this point unfinished) chapter on form contracts (see ch 33). The
chapter discussing the parol evidence rule is also, as of now, unwritten.
29
30
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if one value or goal trumps another in a given type of case,
and even at the expense of complete determinacy.
[W]hen social propositions conflict in establishing a rule,
good judgment must be used concerning the weight and role
to be given to each proposition-just as when values or
goals conflict in life, actors must use good judgment concerning the weight and role to be given to each value or goal
that is relevant to the issue at hand. However, the requirement of good judgment does not confer unrestricted discretion. When conflicting social propositions are relevant to establishing a given rule, the rule should be adopted that
takes appropriate account of each proposition. (ch 1 §§ A-B)
Despite his impatience with what he regards as excessive
academic theorizing, Eisenberg is a friendly critic of the economic approach to contract law, and he regularly makes use of economic ideas in his own work. For example, he is willing to use
the absence of market competition as a factor in determining
unconscionability (ch 4 §§ B-C); counts it as a point in favor of
expectation damages that they provide incentives for efficient
precaution and performance (ch 5 § B); defends the mitigation
principle on grounds of efficiency as well as fairness and causation (ch 11); and ably surveys and assesses several competing
economic accounts of information production as part of his policy
analysis of disclosure regimes (ch 40). When he rejects the use of
economics, he generally does so on one of two grounds: value
pluralism (ch 1 § A) or skepticism of the standard behavioral
model of neoclassical economics (ch 19).
Eisenberg's commitment to methodological and normative
pluralism does not prevent him from subscribing to a number of
fairly consistent jurisprudential and policy positions. He believes that contract interpretation should be organized primarily
around the contracting parties' intentions, although he is wary
of any attempt to evade principles that he considers fundamental to fairness, such as full disclosure of information or the duty
to mitigate losses following breach (see, for example, ch 40 § A;
ch 11). He favors flexible standards over bright-line rules, believes that courts should inquire deeply into contextual details
before making decisions, and in general approves of the loosening of formal doctrine that has characterized the last sixty years
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of doctrinal development in American contract law. 3' He approves of expectation damages and believes that they should be
generously measured,32 although in cases in which consumers or
workers breach obligations to large business entities, he thinks
that the former should not be liable for the latter's lost profits
because it does not make sense for the smaller party to act as
insurer when the larger party has superior ability to spread risk
over the run of transactions (ch 9).
While Eisenberg is highly confident in judges' capacity to
exercise wise judgment under conditions of complexity and uncertainty, he is skeptical that ordinary contracting parties can
do the same. Throughout his manuscript, he appeals to bounded
rationality (ch 19 § 1), cognitive heuristics (chs 19, 42), and limits on the availability of information (chs 19, 39 § A) as reasons
to distrust parties' ex ante decisionmaking. For instance, he argues against liberal enforcement of stipulated damages clauses
on the grounds that contracting parties may underestimate the
likelihood of contractual nonperformance or the losses that may
ensue from it (see chs 18-19),33 and he argues in favor of liberal
reconstruction of relational contracts on the ground that the
parties lack the capacity to choose appropriate long-term plans
before the fact (ch 42).
One might wish for a greater degree of balance in these discussions. While cognitive biases and excess optimism are welldocumented empirical phenomena, there is no reason to think

31

Eisenberg writes:

[C]lassical contract law is a collection of mostly bad rules, such as the rule that
reliance does not make a donative promise enforceable, the rule that if a form
offer and a responsive form that purports to be an acceptance conflict in even
the slightest way no contract is formed, and the rule that an offer for a unilateral contract can be revoked even after the offeree had begun performance. It
would be easy to make classical contract law intelligible, but the only result
would be to make a bad body of law even worse. (ch 1 § A)
32 See ch 5 § B (making clear that expectation damages naturally follow from the
bargain basis of liability); ch 12 (arguing that the principle of Hadley v Baxendale should
be replaced by a less restrictive model that allows for greater recovery by unsophisticated parties); ch 13 (arguing that the goal of compensation should take priority over concerns relating to uncertainty in assessing damages); ch 18 (arguing that alternatives to
expectation damages are unadministrable and offer only miniscule practical advantages
while reducing the consideration given to fairness).
33 Chapter 18 criticizes efforts to develop damage measures that take into account
the value of secrecy, imperfect deterrence, and the costs of contractual search, and chapter 19 justifies close regulation of liquidated damages generally.
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that judges and other public officials are immune to them. 34 Eisenberg suggests at various points that ex post decisionmaking
is better than its ex ante counterpart, because it is based on
more information and because more information is necessarily
better than less (ch 25 § B). 35 But just because more information
is available does not necessarily mean that it will be used appropriately. According to the very same psychological models of
behavior that Eisenberg highlights, new information may be
overweighted because of its salience, its enhanced accessibility
in memory, or its consonance with strongly held prior beliefs.
For instance, judges who spend their days hearing those unusual cases that make it to trial (and scholars who devote their attention to those especially unusual cases that result in a published appellate decision) may forget that these are a select and
stratified subset of the universe of potential disputes, the great
majority of which are settled without disruption to the parties'
relationship. A jurisprudential approach that would be appropriate for this unusual subset of tried cases could be completely
dysfunctional for the larger set that the judge never sees. 36

34 See generally, for example, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U Chi L Rev 571 (1998) (acknowledging the role of hindsight
bias in judicial decisionmaking and demonstrating techniques that courts use to minimize its effect); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think about Risk?, 1 Am L & Econ Rev
26 (1999) (discussing an empirical study of almost one hundred judges revealing systematic errors in risk assessment); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors,Judges, and the Mistreatment of
Risk by the Courts, 30 J Legal Stud 107 (2001) (comparing biased risk assessments of
judges and potential jurors); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell L Rev 777 (2001) (arguing that judges are
not necessarily any less affected by cognitive biases than juries); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey
J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 Cornell L Rev 1 (2007) (discussing different models of judicial decisionmaking bias,
and their implications for the justice system).
35 Eisenberg writes:

Here is a simple proposition: interpretation cannot possibly be more accurate
with less information and less accurate with more information. Accordingly, if
literalism is to be supported, it cannot be on the ground that it leads to more
accurate interpretation. Instead, it must be supported, if at all, on other
grounds. (ch 25 § B)
36 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399, 400-03 (1985) (pointing
out the divide between constitutional provisions that are frequently litigated and other
important provisions that are not). See also Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U Pa L
Rev 1765, 1796-98 (1996) (drawing a distinction between "relationship-preserving
norms," which are used for contractual arrangements that are still in operation, and
"end-game norms," which are used when relationships break down).
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Thus, while the picture of judicial decisionmaking presented
in Eisenberg's pages may be inspiring, one would need a rather
more focused analysis of its context to assess its accuracy than
he provides. Whether ex post judging or ex ante contracting
leads to better outcomes depends, among other things, on the institutional frameworks in which those respective modalities are
embedded. Judicial biases might be corrected (or exacerbated)
by the rules of evidence, the incentives of the adversarial system, or the appellate process. Contracting-party bias might be
corrected (or exacerbated) by market competition, organizational
procedures, or the participation of experienced specialists. And
even in situations in which ex post decisionmaking is more accurate, such accuracy is not necessarily valuable to contracting
parties if the outcome of the investigation cannot be predicted at
37
the time that relevant decisions must be made.
Eisenberg's preference for extensive judicial fact-finding
thus leads him to reject approaches that, while unworkable at
the level of legal doctrine or ex post judicial decisionmaking,
might well be productive when applied to ex ante transactional
design. For example, he is skeptical of attempts to depart from
expectation damages, dismissing alternative measures as being
both of limited value (because, for the majority of contracting
parties, they would be irrelevant) and unadministrable (because
it would be too difficult for courts to determine the situations in
which they would in fact be appropriate).38 But such dismissals
miss the point that these alternatives do not have to be applied
as a default rule in every case. Instead, their scope could be limited to that subset of cases in which the individual parties have
determined up front that the expectation measure is suboptimal
as applied to their exchange.
The main limitation of Eisenberg's approach is that he does
not acknowledge that sometimes private parties have better
37 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determinationof Liability, 37 J L & Econ 1, 12 (1994) (noting that the "trade-off between cost and accuracy" is
relevant to contractual formation); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the
Assessment of Damages, 39 J L & Econ 191, 202 (1996) (showing that the instrumental
benefits of accuracy, as measured by its ability to improve decisions taken under uncertainty, may often be less that the costs of acquiring it).
38 See ch 12 § B (rejecting Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner's theory of information-forcing damage limits); ch 17 § B (expressing doubt about the possibility that
parties could be better off with limited damages that reduce the incentive for wasteful
overreliance); ch 18 § B (rejecting damage measures designed to protect the parties' interests in secret information, and in scaling up damages to compensate for the risk that
breach will not be detected and to compensate for lost costs of search).
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information than judges do. In such cases, it is wasteful to insist
on ignoring that information. Indeed, the existence of decentralized information that is costly for centralized authorities to acquire is the major instrumental reason for facilitating private
39
exchange in the first place.
Despite this important limitation, Eisenberg's book will be
essential reading for contracts scholars and teachers as soon as
it is published. Even as he underestimates the practical value of
formalism and overestimates the capacity of the court system,
his pragmatic and pluralistic methodology provides the best account of how contract doctrine has developed over the past half
century and of how it is applied in most appellate tribunals. All
of us who read and write about contracts should look forward to
its appearance.
III. BIX'S CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT
Of the three authors whose works are under review here,
Bix sets himself the most ambitious task, which, considering the
goals of the first two books, is saying something. His book aims
to present a philosophical introduction to contract law for a nonlegal audience, but he states at the outset (quite sensibly) that,
for the effort to be worth it, the audience needs a strong grounding in actual doctrine (p xi). Accordingly, he endeavors to summarize the law of contracts for the educated outsider and then to
offer a conceptual analysis of what has been summarized-all in
the course of just over 160 pages, including extensive footnotes.
As a result, he is obliged to proceed at breakneck speed in the
middle five chapters (totaling 110 pages) that are devoted to doctrinal analysis. Whether this swift survey serves its purpose for
the intended audience should probably be left to a nonlawyer to
assess, but I would not recommend it to beginning law students
except as review; and experienced law teachers will not find it the
most interesting part of the book.40 (There is one important exception to this last assessment-the extremely well-chosen

39

See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519, 524

(1945).
40 There are also some arguable choices of organization and emphasis: for example,
discussing contract formation (pp 18-53) before basic issues of interpretation have been
introduced (pp 18, 54), giving the objective/subjective distinction no greater space than
less fundamental topics like the battle of the forms (pp 54-55, 25-28), and treating consideration under the rubric of formation rather than analyzing it in the context of a separate discussion of the purposes and limits of contractual freedom (pp 32-37).
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suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter,
where Bix provides a short list of books and articles that explore
the topic under discussion from an unusually catholic set of conceptual perspectives (see, for example, pp 16-17). One could easily base a reading list in an advanced seminar on these suggestions; and I periodically found myself stepping away from the
book in order to address a gap in my scholarly background that
Bix's recommendations enabled me to fill.)41
The sections of the book that will be the most valuable to legally trained readers are the first two and last two chapters. In
the former, Bix briefly sets out his methodological approach to
the topic (pp 1-3) and presents background on the historical
sources of US contract law, which in his account include not just
what contracts teachers usually present as the traditional common law, but Roman law and the English writ system as well
(pp 4-16). Like Baird and Eisenberg, he is a pragmatist; he emphasizes that no universal theory of contract is possible and so
the only sensible course for the scholar is to focus closely on the
details of specific legal systems, topic by topic (pp 148-52).42 But
his pragmatism is more thoroughgoing than that of the other
two authors. In contrast to Baird, he rejects the goal of any
"grand narrative," however flexible. 43 And in contrast to Eisenberg, he appreciates that the value of predictability and simplicity may sometimes outweigh the goal of reaching the conceptual44
ly correct result in every individual case.
Bix's discussion of historical and comparative sources
(which, notably, includes international sources such as the UN
41
The twenty-two-page bibliography at the end of the bbok is also terrific: judiciously chosen and substantially more inclusive than the lists of sources typically found
at the end of introductory texts. Assuming that Bix has read all these sources cover to
cover, I am extremely impressed.
42
The point is underscored by his decision to conclude the doctrinal parts of the
book with a chapter surveying specific categories of contracts that he argues are governed by particularly distinctive principles: employment (pp 119-21), insurance (pp 12122), real estate and landlord-tenant (pp 122-23), franchise (pp 123-24), premarital
agreements (pp 124-25), and government (p 125).
43 Bix writes:

There is an obvious attraction to finding the essence of contract law (perhaps of
contract law everywhere, and in all possible legal systems). Part of the argument of this book ...is that this is not the right-or at least not the bestfocus. ... [A]pproaches to promises and agreements vary too greatly ...from
one jurisdiction to another, and over time, for any universal theory to be justifiable. (p 1)
44 "A persistent theme in this text ...is that government regulation ...of individual
contracting[ ] is hampered to some extent by its need to be general and predictable" (p 2).
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Convention for the Sale of International Goods) is abbreviated to
the point that legal historians or comparativists might view it as
wildly cursory. But it is rare to find even this brief a survey in
an introductory US text or casebook; and its presence underscores Bix's larger point that our law of contracts takes its shape
for historically contingent reasons (how else, for instance, can
we understand the organizing function of the doctrine of consideration?). I would recommend this chapter to students and perhaps even assign it as required reading.
The heart of the analysis, however, is set out in chapters 8
and 9, in which Bix offers his views of the theory of contracts
and of the gaps between theory and practice. Chapter 8 offers a
thoughtful critique of many of the major accounts of contractual
obligation that have attracted the attention of the contemporary
academy: these include autonomy-based theories such as that set
out in Professor Fried's Contract as Promise,46 economic theories
of contract law, and theories based on consent, 46 reliance,47 and
property rights48 (pp 132-36). (For reasons that are unclear,
however, Professor Ian Macneil's widely influential relationalcontract theory 49 has been omitted from this survey, as have the
law-and-society theory arising out of work by scholars at the
University of WisconsinO and solidarity- and virtue-based theories of the sort associated in the previous generation with some

45 See Fried, Contract as Promise at 2 (cited in note 2) ("The regime of contract law,
which respects the dispositions individuals make of their rights, carries to its natural
conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have rights.").
46 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 Colum L
Rev 269, 319 (1986) ("A consent theory of contractual obligation views certain agreements as legally binding because the parties bring to the transaction certain rights and
they manifest their assent to the transfer of these rights.").
47 See, for example, Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract at 184-89 (cited
in note 2).
48 See, for example, Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in Peter Benson, ed, The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays 19, 33-34 (Cambridge
2001).
49 See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S Cal L Rev 691, 720-25
(1974) (arguing that the fundamental unit of contract law analysis should not be the individual transaction, but rather the parties' long-term relationship).
50 For a casebook based on the law-and-society approach, see generally Stewart
Macaulay, John Kidwell, and William Whitford, Contracts: Law in Action: The Concise
Course (LexisNexis 2d ed 2003). For an anthology of law-and-society scholarship, see
generally Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman, and Elizabeth Mertz, Law in Action: A Socio-legal Reader (Foundation 2007).
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participants in the Critical Legal Studies movement, and with
more communitarian-oriented scholars today.51)
In this discussion, Bix is centrally concerned with exposing
what he sees as the gap between theory and reality, particularly
with respect to the ideal of freedom of contract. For him (as for
many other commentators who have written in the years since
mass-produced contract terms have come to be widely used), the
fact that most contracts are no longer individually negotiated
presents a fundamental challenge to all the major academic theories of contract law (pp 136-38), although he thinks that consequentialist theories such as law and economics may be better
placed to address the challenge than nonconsequentialist theories such as Fried's (p 140):
[C]onventional discussions of "meeting of the minds," "assent," and "freedom of contract" have unclear application (if
they have any application at all) when a large proportion of
the transactions entered into are based on agreements presented on standardized forms with large amounts of obscure
language, and with terms not subject to negotiation, and
sometimes involving terms sent in the mail after purchase
or placed on a separate Web site. (When software companies
that want less regulation of their efforts to impose terms on
consumers speak about protecting the freedom of contract,
they unintentionally display how far current contracting
practices are from true mutual assent.) (p 137)
Unlike many modern critics of standard-form contracting,
Bix is less interested in arguing that standardized terms should
be policed by judicial or legislative oversight, or in designing the
appropriate public policy for addressing them, than in exploring
their implications for legal and moral theory.52 (His discussion of
51 See generally, for example, Duncan M. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 Harv L Rev 1685 (1976) (giving a Critical Legal Studies account);
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 Yale L J 1417 (2004) (providing a
communitarian account); Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships,59 Emory L J 649
(2010) (same); Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation for Contract Law, 98
Iowa L Rev 183 (2012) (setting out a contemporary, virtue-based account).
52
Compare Bix, Contract Law at 128-46, with W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv L Rev 529, 533-36
(1971) (criticizing interpretive approaches that defer to standardized terms as undemocratic), Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv L
Rev 1173, 1242 (1983) (arguing that standard terms should be considered presumptively
unenforceable because they redistribute power from individuals to commercial organizations), Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
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whether there is a moral obligation to keep promises that appear in standardized forms (pp 141-44), for instance, is more
than twice as long as his discussion of the appropriate government response to their use (pp 144-45); both discussions conclude with more questions than answers.) Ultimately, he concludes that current theories are not up to the task of explaining
the system of contract law that we actually have and strongly
suggests that the whole theoretical project may need to be torn
down and rebuilt (p 138). Despite (or perhaps because of) his
skepticism, however, he provides what may be the most incisive
short introduction to the conceptual problems raised by standard-form contracting of which I am aware. Anyone who wishes
to make progress in solving these problems will need to delve
further into the literature, but Bix's chapter 8 is an excellent
5
place to start.
In his ninth and final chapter, Bix returns to and elaborates
on the thesis with which he began the book: that no single principle can explain the law of contracts (p 152). The approach that
he recommends in place of unitary theory, however, is rather
different from that propounded by Eisenberg. Instead of celebrating pluralism, he embraces particularism. He points out
that legal doctrines have varied substantially over time and
space, and that many of our legal institutions are with us for no
other reason than historical accident (pp 149-51). He also
stresses the very different features of the agreements that arise
Electronic Age, 77 NYU L Rev 429, 492-93 (2002) (arguing that electronic mass contracts
should be regulated according to the same principles as traditional paper mass contracts), Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, StandardForm Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U Chi L Rev 1203, 1244-45 (2003) (arguing that standard forms should
be carefully supervised to guard against irrational consumer decisionmaking), Margaret
Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law 123-248
(Princeton 2013) (casting judicial oversight of standardized terms as a matter of the rule
of law).
53 Baird (pp 123-46) and Eisenberg (ch 34) also devote substantial space to the issue of standardized contracts, reflecting the importance of the practice to contemporary
exchange as well as doctrine. But their assessments of the issue differ significantly from
Bix's. Eisenberg believes that the problem of assent in form contracts can be adequately
addressed by applying existing principles of contract interpretation, in particular the
principle of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 (1981) that, when the party
providing the form has reason to believe that her counterparty would not have manifested assent if he knew that the form contained a given term, the term is not part of the
contract (ch 4 § D.5). Baird, for his part, acknowledges the risk of overreaching in standard-form contracts to be a serious one, but in his view the problem is not with the negotiation process but rather with the substantive terms contained within the agreement. In
his view, regulators should not focus on the negotiation process, but on the operation of
the market as a whole (pp 133-46).
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out of various social settings. Commercial transactions, consumer purchases, employment relationships, and interfamilial property settlements present widely divergent functional concerns
and moral choices. Why should they all be governed by a single
theory? It might be more helpful, or more enlightening, to have
one theory for commercial contracts and another for personal
contracts, as Karl Llewellyn had in mind when he first began
work on the Uniform Commercial Code. 54 Or it might be appropriate (and fairer) to have one account of how and why we enforce agreements that arise out of individualized negotiations,
and another that explains our treatment of standard forms. Bix
goes so far as to hint that we might even want to have different
theories to explain business contracts with different subject
matters-such as construction, franchise, and insurance agreements-before wisely retreating from the brink of a paralyzing
nominalism (pp 152-53).55
Most readers will have considerable sympathy for Bix's argument that it is a fool's errand to try to bring all of contract
law, even the law of a single jurisdiction at a single moment in
history, into a single theoretical framework. So long as cases are
brought by individual litigants and heard by individual judges
and juries, the diversity and messiness of the real world will
remain essential features of the legal universe. But most readers will likely also resist his more radical speculations that we
might be better off with a panoply of theories tailored to the parties' social status, lines of business, or mode of contracting for
every different doctrinal setting (pp 159-61), or even his more
modest claim that we need different theories for agreements that
give rise to different legal remedies (pp 156-58). Even apart from
the limitations of human memory and the pedagogical imperative

54 See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's
Attempt to Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 Georgetown
L J 1141, 1141, 1146-48 (1985). Llewellyn's vision has been periodically revived over the
years. See, for example, Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L J 541, 593-94 & n 105 (2003).
55 Bix cites Judge Frank Easterbrook's dismissal of cyberlaw as a modern-day "law
of the horse" and Justice Holmes's folktale of the justice of the peace who could find no
rules relating to torts involving churns as cautionary examples in this regard (p 153 n
25), but a more apt illustration might be Borges's Celestial Emporium of Benevolent
Knowledge, which classifies animals into categories that include those that belong to the
emperor, those that are trained, those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, those
that have just broken the flower vase, and those that, at a distance, resemble flies. See
Jorge Luis Borges, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, in Jorge Luis Borges, Other Inquisitions 1937-1952 101, 103 (Texas 1964) (Ruth L.C. Simms, trans).
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to simplify lessons for novices being exposed to a complex reality
for the first time, the analogies between the various applications
of contract law are just too productive, and the themes that run
through the disparate cases are too important. Both mercantile
and consumer agreements, for instance, are subject to ambiguities of language and unaddressed contingencies that need to be
filled in after the fact. Both commercial and familial relationships depend on a web of tacit knowledge and soft information
that the parties can perceive for themselves, but not necessarily
explain (let alone prove) to a third-party fact finder. Construction, employment, franchise, pension, and insurance contracts
all entail irreversible commitments that leave the party who
undertakes them vulnerable to the vagaries of chance or the calculating opportunism of a counterparty. And virtually all contractual arrangements, even between strangers who have never
before met and who will never see each other again, depend on
social and cultural ties as well as legal sanctions for their successful operation. For these reasons, it is not just possible, but
productive, for us to draw conceptual lessons from one contractual setting and apply them to another very different one. Such
connections provide the pragmatic content to Professor F.W. Maitland's maxim that the history of the law is a "seamless web."56
Bix recognizes and effectively concedes these valuable aspects of general theory in the final chapter of his book, which,
consistent with his philosophical expertise and interests, concludes with some useful remarks on what theories are ultimately for. And here too, he remains a pragmatist: theories exist to
be used and to guide our behavior.57 Defective legal theories will
not just cause us to make inaccurate predictions; they may lull
us into accepting unjust practices that we ought to remedy and
deceive the citizenry about the terms on which they are governed. For these reasons:
Perhaps universal and/or general theories and local theories
each offer partial perspectives, portions of the complex
overall truth. Under this view, it is not that general and/or
universal theories are entirely false but that they hide aspects of reality. And in a world of private law theory, where

F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L Q Rev 13, 13 (1898).
Bix writes: 'The larger question remains as before: whether focusing on what is
common among all these different forms of transactions, while downplaying what is distinct, creates more insight than distortion" (p 152).
56
57
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general and/or universal theories of contract law dominate,
it is important that the arguments for local theories be
heard as well. (p 160)
For Bix, as for Baird and Eisenberg, contract theory matters.
Most teachers of the subject, if not most practicing lawyers,
would agree-as do I. But these authors miss an opportunity to
show that contract theory is relevant for practitioners as well,
and, importantly, for law students who aspire to be practitioners. The next Part of this Review sketches out how this might be
done.
IV.

CONTRACT THEORY FOR TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS

To recapitulate the foregoing discussion: All three of the
books under review-Baird's, Eisenberg's, and Bix's-present
valuable syntheses of contract law and theory. The authors have
chosen different priorities and different emphases: Baird aims to
provide coherence, Eisenberg to be balanced and complete, Bix
to deploy analytic rigor. All three navigate the competing demands of formalism and realism; all care deeply about both doctrine and context; and, notwithstanding their theoretical commitments, all subscribe to the pragmatic view of the law
embodied in Justice Holmes's classic observation that "[t]he life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."8 Each discusses the most important modern controversies of the field, including those relating to standard-form contracts, the choice between money damages and specific relief, and the proper scope
of the duty of good faith. And all intend that law students, including first-year students, will constitute an important part of
their audience.
This Part argues, however, that all three books omit one
critical perspective on contract law: the transactional perspective that these students will need to implement in the work that
they are asked to do for their future clients. Private lawyers do
not just litigate contractual disputes, advise clients on the likely
legal consequences of choosing one term or method of contracting over another, or participate in the process of law reform.
They also need to use contract law as a tool to create the structures of agreement that will enable their clients to pursue their
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Holmes, The Common Law at 3 (cited in note 15).
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respective goals and activities with effectiveness. To that end,
they need to know what contract law is actually for.
To understand the point of contract law and its doctrines,
one needs to appreciate how it is different from other bodies of
law. We can concede that some theorists have argued that it is
not so distinctive, and that there is some value in these arguments.5 9 But for it to make sense to talk about the law of contracts at all, as the books under review all do, we need to attend
to the distinctions.
One standard view of how contract law is distinctive holds
that contract liability is voluntary or optional in a way that other forms of civil or criminal liability are not. 60 But there are obvious problems with this view. Tort and criminal liability also
depend on voluntary action; to be liable for battery, I must have
intentionally acted.61 Even in the case of strict liability (for example, if I am sued for keeping a vicious dog that injured a
neighbor's child), I must have voluntarily undertaken the harmcausing actions to be held responsible.62 And conversely, much of
contract liability (classic contract liability, not liability for promissory estoppel or restitution) is not voluntary. For the reasons
discussed in Part I of this Review, such liability is imposed at
least in part based on objective interpretation. And as a practical matter, there are always circumstantial limitations on our
choices. If I live in a neighborhood where there is only one overpriced grocery that sells mostly junk food and a few overripe
fruits and vegetables, and I cannot afford the bus fare and time
to travel to a better store, I am stuck. More generally, my freedom to enter into a contract is limited by the terms to which my
counterparty is willing to agree; that is, by her freedom not to
contract with me.
A better account is the one foreshadowed at the outset of
this Review: in contrast to tort law, which is largely created by

59 See, for example, Gilmore, The Death of Contract at 87-103 (cited in note 2)
(predicting that contract and tort are in the process of merging into a larger system of
civil liability, in which distinctions between voluntary and involuntary liability will be
diminished). See also generally Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 Polit Sci Q 470 (1923) (arguing that the so-called private law
fields of contract and property are properly understood as forms of public law).
60 See, for example, Fried, Contract as Promise at 4 (cited in note 2) (characterizing
tort as generally concerned with "involuntary transactions," while one view of contract is
"based on promise, on obligations that the parties have themselves assumed").
61 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965).
62 See id at § 509.
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courts and legislatures and which aims to regulate the community at large, contractual liability is largely created in decentralized fashion by individual actors for the purpose of pursuing
their own private goals. The state plays an important role in
supporting contractual exchange, to be sure, but its role is to
supply an overall framework; it is left to the individual contracting parties to fill in specific details.
As a result, contract law focuses on problems of cooperation:
primarily (though not exclusively) cooperation in exchange.
Managing cooperation is a distinctively different task from
managing harmful activities; it requires minimizing conflicts of
interest, avoiding misunderstanding, and establishing structures that provide parties with incentives to stick with the deal
when unforeseen events arise, as they inevitably do. Taking
such a perspective does not imply that every contracting problem can be solved by cooperation alone, but it does imply that
more can be accomplished by cooperation than most people-and
significantly, most lawyers-are initially inclined to think.
This perspective on contract law has important implications
for reforming legal education-a topic that has received much
attention in both academic and professional circles in recent
years. If students are to be effectively prepared to facilitate cooperation, they need training in transactional skills, not just legal analysis and argumentation; and they need to learn the difference between argument and advice. But this requires that
they master the principles of what makes some advice good and
other advice bad. A lawyer who is asked to draft or mark up a
lease, but who knows nothing about the standard economic problems that arise in leasing transactions, will not do a very effective job. (In the same way that, if a group of human rights lawyers are asked to draft a new constitution for a transitional
government, and they haven't studied basic lessons of history or
political science, they're unlikely to do an effective job of it.)
For these reasons, private lawmakers need legal theory to
guide their actions just as much as public lawmakers do. Contract theory can help private lawyers to make better design
choices so that their transactional arrangements will better
serve their clients' goals. And it can help contracts teachers as
well, because we are charged with training the private lawyers
who will be asked to undertake these tasks.
It is from just this perspective that economic theories of contract are particularly helpful. Two examples will serve to illustrate
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the point; one is drawn from the doctrines governing contract formation, and the other from the academic literature on remedies.
Traditional contracts scholarship on offer and acceptance
emphasizes how doctrinal rules operate as communicative conventions.63 In this prevailing view, formation rules serve a coordinating function in much the same way that traffic laws coordinate the flow of vehicles by directing drivers to keep to their
side of the road. But while the rules of offer and acceptance do
indeed serve this function, this does not mean that their substantive content is irrelevant from a planning perspective. Different legal rules establish different institutional structures for
negotiation that may call forth different aspects of strategic behavior. As a result, such rules can have important consequences
for the outcome and efficiency of exchange.
For instance, the common law of contracts typically requires
an offeree to respond affirmatively in order to create a binding
obligation; silence or inaction operates as an acceptance only in
special and limited circumstances.64 The usual explanation for
these exceptions is that the circumstances indicate that the offeree has consented or intended to be bound,65 but this is less a
justification of the conclusion than a statement of fact that there
exists a social convention in which those circumstances are taken to imply consent. The convention could be otherwise; and in
order to justify the default rule rather than merely describe it, it
is necessary to offer functional explanations that can distinguish
between alternate conventions.
A straightforward economic analysis helps explain why silent acceptance should be the exception and not the rule. From
an efficiency perspective, communicating offers and acceptances
is costly, but so is communicating rejections. If we knew that the
parties would want to agree on an exchange based on the terms
of the initial offer, it would surely be cheaper to establish this
exchange using one message rather than two. But if there is a

63 For the basis of the following discussion, see generally Avery Katz, The Strategic
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation,89
Mich L Rev 215 (1990); Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer Be Construed as Acceptance, 9 J L,
Econ & Org 77 (1993); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in PreliminaryNegotiations, 105 Yale L J 1249 (1996).
64 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1) (1981) (setting out those limited
cases).
65 See, for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Contracts § 3.14 at 259 (Aspen 2d ed
1998).
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significant chance that the initial offer will be unwelcome, a silent-acceptance regime will require offerees to expend extra resources just to avoid being bound to a bad deal. The efficiency of
the common-law rule compared to a rule of silent acceptance depends on the distribution of possible valuations across the populations of potential offerors and offerees, as well as on the informational and market structure in which negotiation takes
place.66
Even when a silent-acceptance regime is more efficient than
the traditional common-law rule, however, not everyone benefits
from its imposition. The gains from silent acceptance are enjoyed primarily by offerees who attach a high value to exchange.
Offerees who attach a low value to an exchange, in contrast, are
made worse off by such a rule; either they must expend resources sending rejections, or they will be stuck with bargains in
which their costs are higher than their benefits. Offerors also do
relatively better under silent acceptance than do offerees, since
it is rational to offer less favorable terms when it is costly to reject than when it is costly to accept.
For both efficiency and distributional reasons, accordingly,
silent acceptance does not make sense as a default rule in most
contexts. But from the viewpoint of transactional planning, silent acceptance is an option that the parties might well benefit
from choosing if they expect to deal with each other on a series
of occasions and if they have the opportunity to enter into a
master agreement that governs the process by which individual
orders will be posted. For example, merchants such as the Bookof-the-Month Club commonly offer their customers significant
up-front benefits in exchange for the customer's consent to participate in the merchant's negative-option plan. The up-front
benefits are needed to compensate the member for the anticipated risk that the Club will take advantage of the situation ex post
by offering unwanted or overpriced books in a manner that it

66

See Katz, 9 J L, Econ & Org at 78 (cited in note 63):

[Ilf the costs of sending acceptances and rejections are the same and if the
chance of an acceptance is at least one-half, then a silent-acceptance rule
would be more efficient. Conversely, if the expected probability of acceptance is
low, [or] if the cost of rejecting an offer is substantially higher than the cost of
accepting... [then] construing silence as rejection is more efficient.
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will not be worth the member's time and trouble to reject in a
timely fashion.67
Opportunities to bargain over rules of contract formation
are widespread, even in the consumer setting. For example,
Amazon customers who opt into the "l-Click" ordering feature
agree that their action of clicking on a button will operate as an
agreement to purchase, while those who do not must proceed
through multiple screens before their order is finalized.6s This
feature allows customers who want to avoid the time and inconvenience of multiple screens to obtain their order more quickly,
albeit with an increased risk that they will order an unwanted
item by accident or on a momentary impulse.69 Customers who
view the transaction costs of the traditional method as more
costly than the risk of unwanted acceptances can sign up for the
feature, while those who are more concerned about avoiding impulse shopping can choose not to.
The popular Amazon Prime program, which allows customers to purchase a year's worth of free shipping (and free streaming of a defined library of movies, TV shows, and music) for an
up-front, lump-sum price, 70 has analogous effects. In fact, the
transactional structure of the Amazon Prime arrangement is
symmetric to the Book-of-the-Month Club arrangement; instead
of the seller paying the buyer up front for the right to push subsequent purchases, the buyer pays the seller for the right to buy
more expeditiously.
A second illustration of how contract theory can improve
transactional design can be found in the concept of "efficient
breach"-the idea that a contracting party should be encouraged
to breach a contract and pay damages if doing so would be more
67 The Club's incentives to engage in this kind of opportunistic behavior are also
mitigated by concerns for its reputation with other potential members and by its desire
to have the member renew the relationship after the required quantity of books has been
purchased.
68 See About 1-Click Ordering, online at http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeld=468482 (visited Nov 3, 2014).
69 Under the official 1-Click rules, it is possible for the customer to cancel a shipment by navigating to the pending orders page and countermanding the original order,
but the countermand must be issued before the purchase has shipped. See Cancel Items
or Orders, online at http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=help
_search-1-?ie=UTF8&nodeId=595034&qid=1395880384&sr=l-1
(visited Nov 3, 2014).
The upshot, however, is essentially the same: it becomes cheaper to enter into any given
purchase agreement, and more expensive to avoid engaging in a purchase.
70 See About Amazon Prime, online at http://www.amazon.congp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=help-search1-2?ie=UTF8&nodeId=200444160&qid=1395877662&sr-l-2
(visited Nov 3, 2014).
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efficient than performance. Efficient breach is probably the most
well-known concept arising out of the economic analysis of contract law, and probably the most controversial as well. All three
of the books under review devote significant attention to it, with
1
varying degrees of approval.7
These authors' discussions of efficient breach, however, focus entirely on whether it provides adequate justification for
what courts do when measuring damages ex post. What all three
authors miss about the efficient breach concept, however, is that
it provides not just a policy argument in favor of expectation
damages across the board, but an account of how parties might
better design the remedial provisions of their contracts in specific
2
transactions7
In principle, when entering into an agreement, parties could
agree that failed performance would entitle the disappointed
promisee to collect an amount of money equal to estimated expectation damages, something more, or something less.73 They
might also choose to stipulate their ex ante assent to specific
performance, even though doing so cannot bind an equity court
to award that remedy. 74 In any well-functioning market, however, a contract that provides for supracompensatory damages (or
that is enforceable by specific performance) will be accompanied
by a higher price, because the actuarial value of any anticipated
damage payment (or of having to perform, whatever the difficulty)
71 See Baird, Reconstructing Contracts at 58-61 (showing that efficient breach implies that expectation damages are an efficient default rule, but only when the value of
expectation is easily measured); Eisenberg, FoundationalPrinciplesof Contract Law at
ch 15 (arguing that efficient breach will generally be inefficient, and in addition that it
weakens important social norms of promise-keeping); Bix, Contract Law at 115-16 (indicating that efficient breach illustrates tension between consequentialist and nonconsequentist accounts of contractual obligation).
72 Here the analysis follows the argument of Avery Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 Suffolk U L Rev 777, 780-85 (2012).
73 The qualification "in principle" is important because traditional legal doctrine
strongly disfavors agreements under which the parties agree to pay damages in excess of
expectation. See UCC § 2-718(1); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 (providing
that a contract "term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages" "in the light of the
anticipated or actual loss" from breach, or a "term in a bond" that provides for payment
due for "non-occurrence of [a] condition" in an amount that exceeds the loss caused by
such nonoccurrence, "is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty"). But it
will often be possible to achieve the equivalent result through the creation of a bonus for
timely performance or a buyout option.
74 See, for example, Stokes v Moore, 77 S2d 331, 333, 335 (Ala 1955) (stating that
private parties cannot oust a court's "inherent jurisdiction" to determine whether an injunction is appropriate, but that their expressed intent may properly influence the
court's decision whether to exercise its discretionary power).
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will enter into the promisor's cost. Promising to finish a job, no
matter what, is more costly than promising to finish or pay expectation, whichever is less; similarly, promising to finish or pay
expectation is more costly than promising to finish or pay something less than expectation.
Of course, a contract that provides for supracompensatory
damages (or that is enforceable by specific performance) might
have greater benefits for the promisee than one that does not.
This will be the case if damages are difficult to measure or if
they are constrained to fall below true expectation by some independent principle of law (such as the traditional rule that parties must pay their own litigation costs). It will also be the case
if the promisor is potentially insolvent or judgment-proof-in
which case a promise to pay expectation damages must be substantially discounted--or if the promisee attaches some significant noninstrumental value to having the promise performed for
its own sake.
The standard analysis of efficient breach assumes that the
promisee's interest in performance is strictly instrumental, that
promisors are solvent and have reachable assets, and that damages are in practice equivalent to the promisee's lost expectation. Given these assumptions, it follows that both parties are
better off under a regime that awards expectation damages as a
default rule. But in cases in which these assumptions do not
hold, the contracting parties can-and should-do better by contracting around the default if the law allows them to. Only if one
understands the theory of efficient breach, however, is it possible to determine whether contracting around the default makes
sense.
Most of the academic discussion of efficient breach has focused on the normative question whether courts ought to award
specific performance or disgorgement damages more liberally
than they currently do, 75 and whether they should be more willing to enforce supracompensatory liquidated-damages provisions
if it appears that the parties really knew what they were doing.76
There has been almost no scholarly discussion of when private
parties should try to commit themselves to specific performance ex
ante (through arbitration provisions, surety bonds, or otherwise)
75 See, for example, Bix, Contract Law at 115-16; Eisenberg, FoundationalPrinciples of Contract Law at ch 15.
76 See, for example, Baird, Restructuring Contracts at 76-77; Eisenberg, Foundational Principlesof Contract Law at ch 19; Bix, ContractLaw at 107-10.
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or how to better design liquidated-damage clauses to serve their
individual purposes. The legal profession, and the teaching of
contracts, would be better served if there were.
CONCLUSION

Contracts scholars, as well as legal scholars more generally,
often use the distinction between ex ante and ex post perspectives to contrast consequentialist and deontological normative
theories of law. 77 The ex ante perspective is forward looking and
invites us to consider how the actions that we take now will affect the future (for example: If silence is taken as acceptance,
how will that affect people's willingness to make and entertain
offers of contract? If damages are measured with reference to
the expectation interest, how will that affect future promisors'
decisions to perform or breach?). The ex post perspective is
backward looking and invites us to consider whether we approve
of the way that past decisions have turned out and whether we
wish to do anything to rectify the situation (for example: Should
a person who has accepted the benefit of offered services with
reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that
they were offered with the expectation of compensation now be
allowed to enjoy them without paying? Should a person who has
deliberately failed to keep an important promise, but who is
prepared to reimburse the promisee for resultant losses, suffer
any moral disapprobation?). Traditionally, common-law courts
justified their exercise of power over defendants in primarily ex
post terms, but ever since the rise of the Legal Realists, most
American legal theorists have come to accept at least some role
for an ex ante perspective in judicial decisionmaking, in both
private and public law.
This shift toward a forward-looking perspective, however,
has been incomplete in that the majority of theorists still conceive of contracting parties in primarily reactive terms. In the
prevailing mode of analysis, legislatures and courts set the rules
of the game; and the parties adapt. Government institutions still
play the primary planning role; the only difference is that courts
get to play it as well.

77 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 10-12 (1984); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the
Ex Ante Perspective, in Jody S. Kraus and Steven D. Walt, eds, The Jurisprudential
Foundationsof Corporateand Commercial Law 54, 57-58 (Cambridge 2000).
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In a sense, contemporary theorists have overlearned the Legal Realists' lesson that private contract law is just another form
of public economic regulation. The overlearning resides in the
word "just": certainly our collective decision to enforce private
contractual arrangements in the official courts, and to use governmentally raised resources to do so, is an affirmative choice
that must be judged by the standards of political morality. But
this insight should not blind us to the fact that most of the detailed decisions actually to be made in the contractual arena are
made by private parties, or that lawyers and legal scholars can
aid in the exercise of such self-governance.
The three books discussed in this Review focus largely on
legal doctrine and its development in the courts (and to a lesser
extent, in the statute books, hornbooks, and treatises). As a result, they will surely help readers better understand what public
officials have done in the past and what they are likely to do in
the future. These books may even offer useful normative advice
for what those officials should do when they have leeway to interpret or amend the law, for lawyers attempting to persuade
those officials, and for citizens in the role of choosing their government leaders. But none of the books grapples with the fact
that most law students and lawyers will ultimately play a different professional role with respect to the law of contracts; and
as a result, none gives any significant thought to concepts or
principles that might guide the wise exercise of that role. Private lawmakers need contract theory as much as anyone else, if
not more so, but these needs are largely overlooked by these
three distinguished authors.

